Economic Games Quantify Diminished Sense of Guilt in Patients with Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex by Krajbich, Ian et al.
Supplementary Material 
 
Supplementary Table 1: Demographic and neuropsychological background information. 
Means (standard errors) are shown for each of the three subject groups.  Age = Age of patient at time of 
current experiments, in years.  Ed = Years of education completed.  Chr = Chronicity, the time between 
lesion onset and the current experiments, in years.  FSIQ = Full-Scale IQ from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-III.  GMI = General Memory Index from the Wechsler Memory Scale-III (100 is 
normal).  TT = Token Test (from the Multilingual Aphasia Examination), a measure of basic verbal 
comprehension (maximum is 44).  COWA = Controlled Oral Word Association test, a measure of verbal 
fluency.   BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, a self-report measure of depression.  Social:  this measure 
denotes the extent of post-morbid impairment in various aspects of social conduct (derived from the Iowa 
Rating Scales of Personality Change), rated on a three-point scale of mild, moderate, severe.  Of the BDC 
group, 3 subjects had mild social impairments; of the VMPFC group, all but one had severe social  
impairments and one had mild social impairment. 
Task Age Sex Ed Chr FSIQ GMI TT COWA BDI SOCIAL 
NC 57(4) 10M/6F 15(1) N/A 107(1) ND ND 40(3) 2.2 (0.6) Normal 
BDC 49(2) 8M/12F 15(1) 7(1) 101(3) 101(3) 43(1) 42(3) 5.6 (1.1) 3 mild 
VMPFC 57(4) 4M/2F 13(1) 11(4) 106(8) 92(9) 44(0) 39(6) 4.0 (1.7) 5 severe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table 2: Precision estimates for the guilt (β) and E(α) parameters for all VMPFC 
patients and for one representative subject from each comparison group.  We compare the original β and 
E(α) parameters for each individual with the median (standard deviation) parameters derived from 1000 
bootstrapped samples.  The parameters for each bootstrapped sample were estimated using the 
appropriate λ parameters from the Table 2. In many cases, a bootstrapped sample had too few unique 
choices and gave an unbounded parameter estimate. In those cases we replaced all such unbounded 
estimates with the highest bounded estimate from the remaining bootstrapped samples.  For the individual 
where we had to use the 95%-of-the-MLE method (see Supplementary Methods) to get an estimate of 
E(α), we were not able to generate a precision estimate for that parameter. We were not able to generate 
precision estimates for the envy (α) and E(β) parameters because those estimations were more difficult 
and always required use of the 95%-of-the-MLE method for one parameter or the other. 
 
Subject Original (β) 
 
Bootstrapped β
 
Original E(α) 
 
Bootstrapped E(α) 
 
VMPFC 0 0 (0) 1661 NA 
VMPFC 17 16 (29) 99 100 (37) 
 
VMPFC 19 18 (29) 475 476 (173) 
VMPFC 36 35 (38) 472 474 (174) 
VMPFC 36 36 (24) 
 
472 473 (175) 
VMPFC 152 152 (261) 450 450 (160) 
BDC 73 72 (59) 20 36 (42) 
NC 202 202 (149) 479 480 (210) 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table 3: Raw data from the VMPFC lesion patients on the dictator, ultimatum and trust 
games. 
 
Subject 
 
Dictator
Offer 
 
Ultimatum 
Offer 
 
Ultimatum
Demand 
 
Trust/ 
Repay 
T=45 
 
Trust/ 
Repay 
T=60 
 
Trust/ 
Repay 
T=60 
R=(30,30) 
Trust/ 
Repay 
T=100 
 
1 0 25 25 End, 
Betray 
End, 
Betray 
End, 
Betray 
End, 
Betray
2 0 20 20 End, 
Betray 
End, 
Repay 
Trust, 
Betray 
End, 
Betray
3 0 20 20 End, 
Repay 
End, 
Betray 
 
End, 
Betray 
 
End, 
Betray 
 
4 5 20 20 Trust, 
Betray 
Trust, 
Betray 
 
Trust, 
Betray 
 
Trust, 
Betray 
 
5 10 20 20 Trust, 
Repay 
Trust, 
Repay 
Trust, 
Repay 
 
End, 
Betray
6 13 15 20 Trust, 
Betray 
Trust, 
Betray 
End, 
Betray 
Trust, 
Betray
 
J 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1 
Structure of the games used in our study.  Extensive-form structures are shown for (a) the dictator game, 
(b) the ultimatum game, and (c) the trust games.  Each game tree depicts the choices and payoffs for the 
two players, with time flowing from left to right.  Every node of the tree indicates a choice, and the 
numbers at the right end of each branch indicate the resulting payoffs for that choice.  All choices and 
payoffs for the first-mover are displayed in blue, while the choices and payoffs for the second mover are 
displayed in red.  In the dictator game, subjects were asked how much money they would donate; in the 
ultimatum game, how much they would offer and also what they would be willing to accept if somebody 
else had made them an offer.  In the trust game, subjects were asked whether they would Trust the other 
player or End the game, and also whether they would Repay or Betray the other player, contingent on him 
choosing Trust as the investor.  Three versions of the trust game varied the temptation payoff T=45, 
T=60, and T=100. A fourth game used T=60 and changed the Repay payoffs to R=(30,30).  
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Methods 
Lesion location 
Briefly, vmPFC includes the medial OFC together with dorsomedial cortex contiguous with it.  
Specifically it includes the gyrus rectus, medial half of the orbital gyrus, and inferior half of the medial 
prefrontal surface, encompassing parts of Brodmann Areas 11,12,13,25,32 and 10 as well as white matter 
subjacent to these.  This is a definition we have used in many other studies from our laboratory as well, 
and it reflects the shared yet variable damage that typically produces defects in social behavior.  It 
notably includes anterior sectors, extending to the pole, provided these are not very dorsal or lateral.  
 
The majority of BDC lesions were in posterior regions of the brain, in occipital, parietal, and temporal 
lobe.  Most of these were strokes, although some were neurosurgical resections.  Lesion volumes 
encompassed a broad range; in particular, there were several subjects in the BDC group who had lesions 
at least as large as any in the VMPFC group.  Both VMPFC and BDC groups had a large range of lesion 
sizes and we did not find any evidence, and have not generally in our prior studies, that lesion volume as 
such contributes significantly to the impairments reported. 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
The procedure finds values of α and E(α) (or β and E(β)) which yield an expected utility (according to 
formula (1) and the specific game structure) for each choice, and a probability of making each choice 
given those utilities and the parameter λ (according to the second equation in the methods section of the 
text). The MLE estimates are those values of α and E(α) (or β and E(β)) and λ which maximize the 
product of the probabilities of the choices that are actually observed.  MLE estimates were done with 
Mathematica’s NMaximize (Differential Evolution) function with ten different random seeds, using a 
standard log-likelihood transformation.   
 
Truncation technique 
If a subject consistently made completely altruistic or envious decisions (e.g., always offering 25 
in dictator and ultimatum games, and always choosing Repay), the best parameter fit for α, β, E(α) or 
E(β) could be infinite, which is not reasonable and limits our ability to detect differences in groups. In 
these cases, we found a sensible lower bound parameter giving a predicted probability equal to 95% of 
the probability derived from MLE.  These bounds represent a compromise between the best-fitting 
parameter (which is larger than the bound) and the prior belief that infinite guilt and envy are not 
sensible. Put differently, if for example, we had used much larger values of the temptation parameter T in 
the trust games, we could have derived better empirical bounds on α and β, but doing so would have 
required more tasks and overburdened our lesion subjects. 
 To estimate approximate bounds on individual parameters, we used the λ value obtained from 
the group analysis, narrowed the parameter estimation to the individual level and determined the 
asymptotic MLE value for each subject with unbounded parameters. Since the MLE value is just the 
product of the fitted probabilities of the decisions that were made, we took its nth root, (where n is the 
number of decisions made by the subject), giving us a geometric mean probability. We then multiplied 
the geometric mean by 0.95, and used this new probability to infer a cutoff MLE value. With this value in 
hand, we went back to the individual’s parameter estimation and found the lowest parameter combination 
such that the resulting MLE value was at the 95% cutoff just calculated. This procedure corrects, 
approximately, for the fact that by limiting the number of our games, some estimated parameter values 
were probably too high. Imputing the α, β, E(α) and/or E(β) parameters which leads to fitted choice 
probabilities that are 95% as high is a way of computing a plausible lower bound which enables further 
analysis. That is, the bound we compute does not fit the data best, but fits only 5% worse and represents a 
compromise between a likely empirical value (that could be derived more precisely from a larger battery 
of games) and the best-fitting value, which is implausibly and imprecisely bounded in a very wide range.  
In many cases the envy analyses resulted in unbounded parameter estimates for both α and E(β). In those 
cases we fixed E(β) to be the highest value found in any of the other bounded estimates, and then used the 
95% procedure described above to estimate α.  
 
Binning 
The MLE method does poorly when there are many possible strategies so in a few cases we 
rounded subjects’ choices in the dictator decisions.  For the dictator game, we used three possible 
choices: giving 0, 10 or 25 out of 50 points (1 control (4), 3 frontals (5,5,13), and 5 normals 
(5,20,20,20,20) were affected by this).  The maximum likelihood procedure also does not work well when 
subjects make certain unusual choices. In a few rare cases, subjects offered or demanded more than half 
of the points in the dictator and ultimatum games. (This happened for n=3 subjects in dictator games, n=3 
subjects in ultimatum offers, and n=4 subjects in ultimatum acceptance judgments; none were VMPFC 
patients.) The envy/guilt-aversion specification cannot account for such decisions because it assumes that 
people prefer more money to less but also have some preference for equality, so they will never sacrifice 
their own payoffs in a way that creates more inequality (e.g. giving more than half to someone else). In 
the few cases where subjects offered or demanded more than half of the points, we scaled their offers 
down to 25. 
 
 
Supplemetary Results 
Epps-Singleton  
For the Trust and Repay results in Table 1, we also performed Epps-Singleton tests, which are 
widely used in experimental economics to test whether two samples come from the same distribution 
(Epps and Singleton, 1986). 
 
For the trust decisions the Epps-Singleton p-values were: 
VMPFC vs. BDC – p = 0.18 
VMPFC vs. NC – p = 0.14 
BDC vs. NC – p = 0.16 
 
For the repay decisions the Epps-Singleton p-values were: 
VMPFC vs. BDC – p = 0.02 
VMPFC vs. NC – p = 0.05* 
BDC vs. NC – p = 0.05 
 
*Note that the Epps-Singleton test gives a warning message for this comparison, suggesting that the p-
value may be inaccurate. 
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